Abstract. Fault trees are top-down formal deductive analytic tools with diverse applications in many fields such as reliability, safety and security. Forward fault tree analysis (FTA) can be termed a priori analysis since it predicts the top-event probability in terms of basic-event probabilities. This paper offers a tutorial exposition and a detailed comparison of two kinds of backward or a posteriori FTA that are implemented in the probability domain and in the Boolean domain, respectively. For the probability-domain a posteriori FTA, it is assumed that the top event probability is known. For example, when the top event is presumed to have occurred, then it has a probability of one. The analysis proceeds recursively in the probability domain to assess the probabilities of lower events under certain realistic assumptions such as mutual exclusiveness or statistical independence of the input events for a specific gate, and with the utilization of educated guesses on certain ratios of probabilities of such events. This paper offers a detailed mathematical procedure for implementing this a posteriori FTA that makes the most of the concept of duality. The procedure is demonstrated via a detailed illustrative example. The paper also considers the a posteriori FTA in the Boolean domain. Such an analysis is available in the literature in terms of the very powerful tool of Bayesian Networks (BNs). We demonstrate here that in many cases this analysis is still possible via elementary faulttree manipulations that use the concept of a Boolean quotient to effectively implement Bayes' Theorem in the Boolean domain. Again, a demonstrative example is given to illustrate the Boolean a posteriori FTA, explain its details, and show that the power of BNs is not really warranted in simple cases. A detailed comparison between the two kinds of a posteriori FTA is also given to identify their similarities and differences.
Introduction
Fault trees are top-down formal deductive analytic tools that have applications in many fields such as reliability, safety, and security, albeit sometimes they are used under a variety of unwarranted disguised names such as success trees, elicitation trees, attack trees, defense trees, etc. Conventional fault tree analysis (FTA) might be termed a forward, a priori, or predictive analysis since it obtains the top-event probability in terms of basic-event probabilities, or more generally it decides the probability of any higher-level event in the tree in terms of the probabilities of its lower-level events [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . The reverse type of FTA might be termed a backward, a posteriori, or diagnostic analysis. There are (at least) two kinds of this analysis, which are to be reviewed, analyzed, demonstrated, compared and interrelated in this paper.
The first kind of a posteriori FTA is due to Shooman [21, 22] . In this kind of analysis, it is assumed that the top event has a known probability, e.g., the top event could be considered to have actually occurred and hence possess a probability of one. The analysis proceeds recursively in the probability domain to assess the probabilities of lower events under certain realistic assumptions such as mutual exclusiveness or statistical independence of the input events for a specific gate, and utilization of educated guesses on certain ratios of probabilities of such events. By contrast, the second kind of a posteriori analysis, as reported by Bobbio, et al., [23] and Langseth and Portinale [24] is in essence a classical Bayesian analysis involving an equivalent of the Total Probability Theorem, and Bayes' Theorem [25] .
A detailed comparison between the two kinds of a posteriori analysis is given in Table 1 .
Various aspects of the comparison in Table 1 will become clarified further as we proceed throughout this paper. While Shooman [22] restricted the a posteriori FTA to that of OR gates with Mutually Exclusive (ME) inputs, we extend the analysis to include both AND gates with Statistically Independent (SI) inputs and OR gates with either ME or SI inputs. We derive general solutions for all types of gates and conditions with arbitrary numbers of inputs. We also outline the solution of the general case based on the use of the InclusionExclusion Principle with simplifying assumptions other than the ME or SI assumptions.
The second kind of a posteriori analysis is typically conducted by mapping fault trees into the more powerful tool of Bayesian networks (BNs), which are known also (occasionally with minor differences) as belief nets, causal networks, probabilistic-dependence graphs, or influence diagrams. Bayesian networks have better capabilities than standard fault trees, such as their capabilities to handle uncertainty, statistical dependence or multi-state behavior [23, 24, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . However, the use of BNs in a posteriori FTA might not be warranted in many important problems that can still be handled via (the somewhat modest) capabilities of fault trees.
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 lists our notation, abbreviations and certain useful nomenclature. Section 3 presents the a posteriori analysis of fault trees in the probability domain. The main thesis of this section is that such an analysis necessitates only the a posteriori analysis of single gates. Therefore, section 3 discusses the general a posteriori analysis of single AND or OR gates, and then derives (under a variety of appropriate assumptions) a posteriori solution for an AND gate with SI inputs, an OR gate with ME inputs, and an OR gate with SI inputs. The results obtained are applied to a detailed fault-tree example. Section 4 treats the a posteriori analysis of fault trees in the Boolean domain. We demonstrate here that in many cases this analysis is possible via elementary fault-tree manipulations that use the concept of a Boolean quotient (known also as a Boolean ratio, subfunction or restriction) [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] [51] [52] to implement Bayes' Theorem effectively in the Boolean domain. Again, a demonstrative example is given to illustrate the Boolean a posteriori FTA and explain its details, and show that the power of BNs is not really warranted in simple cases. A detailed comparison between the two kinds of a posteriori FTA is also given with the hope of setting the stage on how they can be further interrelated and even combined. Section 5 concludes the paper and points out new directions for further research. [22] Bobbio, et al., [23] ; Langseth and Portinale [24] 2. Notation, Abbreviations and Nomenclature C. Nomenclature Forward (a priori or a predictive) fault tree analysis:
A fault-tree analysis in which the basic-event probabilities are known. The analysis chains forward to obtain higher-level event probabilities and terminates with a prediction of the top-event probability. This is the conventional fault-tree analysis, and it is what is meant when simply fault-tree analysis is mentioned. Backward ( a posteriori or diagnostic ) fault tree analysis: A fault-tree analysis in which the top-event probability is known. This analysis is mainly used when the top event is assumed to have occurred and hence has a probability of one. A posteriori FTA of the first kind: A fault-tree analysis that chains backward to obtain lower-level event probabilities (under certain realistic assumptions), and terminates with a knowledge of all basic-event probabilities. The analysis relies on the solution of algebraic equations expressing probabilities of the inputs of a certain gate in terms of the probability of its output. Such a solution proceeds recursively from the top gate (whose output has a known probability, typically one) to lower-level gates terminating at the leaf gates. Typically, the analysis relies on the expert guessing of certain ratios among probabilities of various gates.
A posteriori FTA of the second kind:
A fault-tree analysis that starts with a priori knowledge of basic-event probabilities, utilizes this knowledge in forward analysis to compute the top-event probability, and then (under the assumption that the top event has occurred) uses Bayes' theorem to deduce the a posteriori basicevent probabilities.
Bayesian Network (BN):
A directed acyclic graph in which discrete random variables are assigned to each node, together with the conditional dependence on the parent nodes. Root nodes are nodes with no parents, and marginal prior probabilities are assigned to them. The main feature of a BN is that it is possible to include local conditional dependencies into the model, by directly specifying the causes that influence a given effect. Bayesian Networks [23, 24] are usually defined on discrete random variables, though some extensions have been proposed for extending the formalism to some form of continuous random variables. BN are more suitable to represent complex dependencies among components and to include uncertainty and multi-state behavior in modeling [23, 24] .
Mapping BNs into FTs:
It is quite straightforward to map a given FT into an equivalent BN with binary nodes, where the FT's gates (with input and output events) are mapped into small BN fragments, whose combination produces the whole BN corresponding to the given FT. In other words, the modular construction of an FT can be mapped into a modular construction of an equivalent BN. The modeling flexibility of the BN formalism can accommodate various kinds of statistical dependencies Uncertainties, and multi-state behavior that are difficult to include in the FT formalism [23, 24] .
Reliability-Ready Expression (RRE):
An expression in the switching (Boolean) domain, in which logically multiplied (ANDed) entities are statistically independent and logically added (ORed) entities are disjoint. Such an expression can be directly transformed, on a one-to-one basis, to the algebraic or probability domain by replacing switching (Boolean) indicators by their statistical expectations, and also replacing logical multiplication and addition (ANDing and ORing) by their arithmetic counterparts Rules for the conversion of a general switching (Boolean) expression into a PRE are provided in [8, 9, [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] .
Duality:
The dual of a switching function is obtained by complementing the function and all its switching arguments (inverting both output and inputs) [56] [57] [58] .
The a Posteriori Analysis in the Probability domain
Since the a posteriori analysis of a fault tree can be accomplished in terms of that of single gates, this section is devoted to the a posteriori analysis of single AND or OR gates, first generally, and then subject to the Mutual Exclusiveness (ME) or Statistical Independence (SI) assumptions. The analysis technique is then demonstrated via a detailed numerical example.
General Analysis of AND and OR gates
The aim of this subsection is to discuss the general analysis of AND and OR gates, stress the utility of the concept of duality in such analysis, and point out the considerable reduction in complexity when the inputs are either Mutually Exclusive (ME) or Statistically Independent (SI). The output of an AND gate of inputs , , … , has a probability given in terms of conditional probabilities as [25] P(a ) = P e = P(e )P(e |e )P(e |e e ) … P(e |e e … e ), (1) while the output of an OR gate of inputs , , … , has a probability given by the InclusionExclusion Principle [25, 59, 60] :
Note that (2) expresses the output of an OR gate in terms of the outputs of many binary or multiinput AND gates, which need to be expressed via (1) 
a = e ⇔ a = e .
According to (3) and (4), the analysis of an AND (OR) gate can be converted to the dual analysis of an OR (AND) gate. Therefore, the analyst has a choice to analyze any given gate directly as is or indirectly in terms of its dual gate. The analysis of an AND gate via (1) requires the use of conditional probabilities, while the analysis of an OR gate via (2) involves an exponential number (2 − 1) of terms, many of which necessitate the use of conditional probabilities in expressions similar to (1). There is a considerable reduction in the complexity of the analysis when the events e are either Mutually-Exclusive (ME) or Statistically Independent (SI).
If the events e are ME, i.e., if ∩ = ∅ ∀ i and j,
then (1) and (2) reduce respectively to ( ) = 0, ME ,
If, instead the events are SI, i.e., if
then (1) and (2) reduce respectively to
Note that (11) can also be obtained from (3) and (10) in the equivalent complementary form
Analysis of an AND gate with SI inputs
We assume that the probability of the output of the AND gate is known, say . This probability is exactly 1 if the event is known to have occurred. Otherwise, it would be available through expert estimation or through a posteriori analysis of higher-level gates. Since the inputs of the AND gate are SI, equation (10) is applicable and reduces to ( ) = , .
Following Shooman [9] , we assume that we can express each of the probabilities in (13) as a ratio of the last probability among them ( ), namely
where = 1. Substituting (14) in (13), we solve (13) for each of the probabilities ( ) as
Analysis of an OR gate with ME Inputs
The case studied in this subsection is the only case studied by Shooman [22] . Here, equation (7) is applicable, and the probability of the output of the OR gate is known, say . Hence, equation (7) can be rewritten as:
Now, making the assumption (14) and substituting (14) in (16), we can solve (16) for each of the probabilities ( ) as:
Note that (17) for the ME inputs of OR has some resemblance with (15) for the SI inputs of AND.
Analysis of an OR gate with SI inputs
The OR gate with SI inputs is analyzed in a direct fashion in subsection 3.4.1 and is analyzed via its dual representation in subsection 3.4.2.
Direct Analysis
The output of an OR gate with inputs can be written as:
Since the event is statistically independent of each of the events (1 ≤ ≤ − 1), then it is also independent of their union . The expression (18) allows the Inclusion-Exclusion Principle (2) to be rewritten as:
Now, we assume that we can express ( ) as a ratio of ( ), i.e.
and hence obtain the following quadratic equation in ( )
Equation (22) has two solutions:
where the discriminant is
In (24), we made use of the fact that is a probability and hence must be less than or equal to 1. Equation (24) indicates that the discriminant is non-negative, and hence both roots in (22) are real. Equation (24) also indicates that √ ≤ (1 + ), (25) and hence both roots in (23) are positive. However, we now reject the positive sign in (23) since it corresponds to the solution
which corresponds to a probability ( ) > 1 if < 1, and to a probability ( ) > 1 if > 1. The only possibility of accepting the positive sign in (23) is the trivial case = 1, = 1 for which is 0 and the two roots in (22) are equal. Hence, our final solution of (22) is
Now we use to denote ( ) and continue our work recursively to obtain the probabilities ( ), ( ), … , ( ). 
Dual Analysis
An alternative analysis of an OR gate with SI inputs is possible via equation (12) . Now, we assume that each of the probabilities of the complementary events in (12) is expressed as a ratio of the last probability among them ( ̅ ), i.e., Fig. 2 . Assigning probabilities for n statistically-independent inputs of an OR gate given the probability of its output. 
In passing, we note that we used the assumption (28) to obtain a simple solution. Had we insisted on using the assumption (14), we would have obtained an th -degree equation in each ( ). The alternative (equally good) assumption in (28) saved us the trouble of solving an th degree polynomial equation and the associated difficulty of selecting the appropriate root from a set of roots.
Example 1:
Figure 3 displays a fault tree that combines all the special cases considered. It has an OR gate with three ME inputs, an AND gate with three SI inputs, and an OR gate with three SI inputs. Let us assume that the top event probability ( ) is known to be = 0.9. We need to find all the basic-event probabilities. We start by estimating the probabilities of the events , , and which are the ME inputs of the top OR gate. We now assume we know the following probability ratios. 
Hence, according to (17) , we obtain
As expected ( ), ( ) and ( ) are in the ratio of 0.2: 0.3: 1.0 and add up to = 0.9. We now know the probability of the output of the AND gate, and need to assess the probabilities of its inputs , , and .
Again we assume we know the following probability ratios. Hence , according to (15) , we obtain
( ) = ( )/( ) = 0.84343. (33 ) As expected ( ), ( ) and ( ) are (to within roundoff-errors) in the ratio 0.4: 0.5: 1.0 and their product is 0.12. Likewise, we use our knowlodge of the probability of the output of the OR gate with inputs , , to estimate the probabilities of these inputs. We use the dual analysis in Sec. 3.4.2, and starting with ( ̅ ) = 0.4, we obtain ( ̅ ), ( ̅ ) and ( ̅ ). We assume we know the probability ratios 
Hence, according to (29), we obtain 
The a Posteriori Analysis in the Boolean Domain
In this section, we demonstrate how to apply Bayes' theorem to achieve a posteriori FTA via manipulations in the Boolean domain. Let the top event be denoted by and a basic event be denoted by , then Bayes' Theorem [25] states that
provided { } ≠ 0. This theorem can be restated In terms of the indicator variables and of the events and when noting that the various probabilities in (36) can be rewritten as expectations, i.e.,
So that (36) can be rewritten as
Equation (38) is valid provided { } ≠ 0. Now we can obtain the a posteriori probability { | } by pursuing the following steps:
1. Express as a PRE (preferably the simplest possible) as a Boolean function of indicator variables (including X). Note that the job of forming a PRE is needed only once ( at this initial step).
The indicator variable ( | ) is the
Boolean quotient of with respect to , i.e.
Further information on the Boolean quotient is given in Appendix A. Since is in PRE form, each ( | ), for any choice of , is also in PRE form.
The indicator variable (
Since ( | ) is independent of and is in PRE form, then ∧ ( | ) is also in PRE form.
4. The expectations { ∧ } and { } in the RHS of (38) are now obtained immediately as one -to-one transformations of the PREs for ( ∧ ) and ( ).
The details of this method is now illustrated by applying it to a fault-tree example studied via Bayesian Networks by Bobbio, et al., [23] .
Example 2:
This example, originally taken from Malhotra and Trivedi [61] , deals with the fault tree shown in Fig. 4. Bobbio, et al. , [23] solve this example by mapping the fault tree into a Bayesian network. We will demonstrate that such a mapping is not really warranted since fault-tree techniques suffice in this case. The fault tree represents a redundant multiprocessor system, with a single bus N connecting two processors and having access to a local memory bank each ( and ), and through the bus to a shared memory bank , so that if the local memory bank fails, the processor can use the shared one. Each processor is connected to a mirrored disk unit. If one of the disks fails, the processor switches on the mirror. The whole system is functional if the bus is functional and one of the processing subsystems is functional. With a little abuse of notation, we are using the same upper-case uncomplemented literal to denote a component, and also to denote the indicator variable for its failure. We can write the indicator T for the top event as a disjunction of cutset failures as in (3) of Bobbio, et al., [23] , but if we do so, we lose the ability to utilize statistical independence among basic events and end up with a complicated expression for the top-event probability. Instead, we write as
where and are given by
We note that and would have been statistically independent had there been no common element between them. To circumvent this problem, we use a BooleanShannon expansion about to obtain = 0 ∨ 1
Note that (44) contains two disjoint parts, thanks to the appearance of in the first part and in the second part. The subfuctions of in the two parts now consist each of factored statistically independent entities. We substitute (44) into (41), and use disjointing techniques [2, 8, 9, [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] [58] [59] [62] [63] [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] to convert the resulting expression into the Probability-Ready Expression
The PRE (45) is converted, on a one-to-one basis, into the probability expression
. (46)" Fig. 4 . Fault Tree for a multiprocessor system (taken from [23] and [61] ). Table 3 shows the a priori failure probabilities assumed by Bobbio, et al., [23] , and the a posteriori failure probabilities computed by them via BayesianNetwork modelling. Table 3 also reports a posteriori probabilities computed via (38) , under the assumption of equal reliabilities for similar components, i.e., = = = = , = = , and = = = . Thanks to (38) , (40) and (46), one obtains
Component
The a priori failure probabilities
The a posteriori failure probabilities of Bobbio, et al., [10] The a posteriori failure probabilities of (38) = .
. .
= .
In passing, we note that
The results obtained in Table 3 are at best intriguing. We were expecting to obtain identical or at least approximately equal results in the second column of Table 3 (the a posteriori failure probabilities of Bobbio, et al., [23] ), and the third column of Table 3 (the a posteriori failure probabilities computed herein via (38) ). However, while the values for , , and are somewhat reasonably similar, the values for each of and differ by one order of magnitude. We argue that our computations are based on a simple fault-tree model that exactly fits our needs, and hence it is preferable according to Ockham's (Occam's) razor, which requires a model to retain the minimum of assumptions and details needed to capture all the essential features of what the model represents while excluding any extraneous or distracting features [72] . The details of our model are visible enough to allow an interested reader to check it by verifying the derivation of our equations and reproducing our numbers with a small calculator. In particular, our a posteriori failure probabilities can be easily seen to pass a simple check of satisfying the following conditional-probability equation derivable from (45) .
Conclusions
We presented and compared two kinds of a posteriori analysis of fault trees, namely an analysis in the probability domain, and another in the Boolean domain. The main thesis of the probability-domain FTA is that it necessitates only the a posteriori analysis of single gates. Therefore, we discussed the general a posteriori analysis of single AND or OR gates, and then derived (under a variety of appropriate assumptions) a posteriori solution for an AND gate with SI inputs, an OR gate with ME inputs, and an OR gate with SI inputs. The results obtained are applied to a detailed fault-tree example. In addition, we treated the a posteriori analysis of fault trees in the Boolean domain. We demonstrated that in many cases this analysis is possible via elementary fault-tree manipulations that use the concept of a Boolean quotient (known also as a Boolean ratio, subfunction or restriction) to effectively implement Bayes' Theorem in the Boolean domain. Again, a demonstrative example was given to illustrate the Boolean a posteriori FTA and explain its details, and show that the power of Bayesian networks (BNs) is not really warranted in many simple (albeit significant) cases. A detailed comparison between the two kinds of a posteriori FTA was also given to set the stage for explaining how these two kinds can be interrelated and even combined. The essential difference between the two kinds is that the first kind takes place in the probability domain and relies on educated guessing and solution of algebraic equations, while the second kind is a novel implementation of Bayes' Theorem in the Boolean domain, and acts occasionally as a suitable alternative to using the too-powerful technique of Bayesian networks. We stress herein that results obtained via the second kind of a posteriori FTA are much easier to verify and replicate than those obtained via Bayesian networks.
Further research is needed to utilize the two aforementioned kinds of a posteriori FTA in more practical situations, and to explore the possibility of existence of other kinds of a posteriori FTA. The comparison between the given two kinds of a posteriori FTA should be extended to further interrelate and even combine them. The implementation of Bayes' Theorem in the Boolean domain warrants further investigation, and opens new avenues for pedagogical and computational applications in probability theory and reliability engineering. An urgent issue to pursue is to solve many simple as well as complicated examples via both the second kind of a posteriori FTA and the Bayesian-network analysis to see if they do really agree or to identify reasons of disagreement between them and to locate where discrepancy between them emerges.
